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Abstract
We have extended a two player game-theoretical model proposed by V. Gurvich [To theory of multi-step games, USSR Comput.
Math and Math. Phys. 13 (1973)] and H. Moulin [The Strategy of Social Choice, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1983]: All the
considered game situations are framed by the same game structure. The structure determines the families of potential decisions
of the two players, as well as the subsets of possible outcomes allowed by pairs of such choices. To be a solution of a game, a
pair of decisions has to determine a (pure) functional equilibrium of the situational pair of payoff mappings which transforms
the realized outcome into real-valued rewards of the players. Accordingly we understand that a structure is stable, if it admits
functional equilibria for all possible game situations; and that it is complete, if every situation that only partitions the potential
outcomes, is dominated by one of the players. We have generalized and strengthened a theorem by V. Gurvich [Equilibrium in
pure strategies, Soviet Math. Dokl. 38 (1989)], proving that a proper structure is stable iff it is complete. Additional results provide
game-theoretical insight that focuses the inquiry on the complexity of the stability decision problem; in particular, for coherent
structures.
These results also have combinatorial importance because every structure is characterized by a pair of hypergraphs [C. Berge,
Graphes et Hypergraphes, Dunod, 1970] over a common ground set. The structure is dual (complete/coherent) iff the clutter of one
hypergraph equals (includes/is included in) the blocker of the other one. So, for non-void coherent structures, the stability decision
problem is equivalent to the much studied subexponential [M.L. Fredman, L. Khachiyan, On the complexity of dualization of
monotone disjunctive normal forms, J. Algorithms 21 (1996)] hypergraph duality decision problem.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since its beginning [3] game theory has had difficulties in defining what should be considered a solution of a game.
Because even for the most appealing formalizations, there are games that have no solution; see, for instance, [12]. Such
unsolvable games would typically frustrate involved players who could not gasp the tempting rewards. Therefore they
also worried game theoreticians. This is probably the reason why some authors began to qualify the original game-
theoretical convictions, and started to visualize structures that coin or delimit the universe of situational games that
may take place, as well as what should be considered their solutions. Then it became natural to blame the prevailing
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structures for the frustrations they were not able to prevent. It became sensible to ask, what particular properties
such a structure must have, so that all possible games permit solutions. According to some authors [13,9] only such
a structure may considered to be stable; otherwise, unsettled game situations, through the frustrations they produce,
would react against their structural determinants and destabilize them.
For this paper’s purpose we adopt a categorical formal version of this point of view: We assume that a structure
essentially is a solving principle put into practice; and that it therefore gets questioned by any potential failure of
the principle. Universal principles are like mathematical conjectures: they get disproved by counterexamples. So any
potential situation that resists solution, questions the structure; even if the situation does not really take place. Only
universal solvability guarantees stability of the structure.
In this paper we consider such a structural stability problem. We are going to build on a game-theoretical model
that adopts the classical Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) solution concept; and assumes that the games that can
take place in various situations, are all framed by a given game form [7,8,2,10]. A game form is called Nash-solvable
if all the games that the form allows have Nash equilibria. A peak result of this inquiry – Theorem 1 of [10] – then
proves that if the game form, structurally, only includes two players, then the game form will be Nash-solvable iff
the game form is tight; i.e., iff the pair of hypergraphs that the form determines – one for each player – is dual. We
extend this game-theoretic model from game forms to structures that are pairs of hypergraphs over a common finite
ground set. So this class of structures includes, as special cases, those determined by game forms [10]. Since now all
such pairs of hypergraphs are possible structures, this model also allows us to express game-theoretical reformulation
of all the questions raised by the hypergraph duality theory [6,11,14,4].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we first gather some classical results on hypergraphs which we
shall later use to develop our game-theoretical considerations. In Section 3 we introduce to the indispensable game-
theoretical background. In Section 4 we recycle classical blocker theory [5] to analyze the solvability of structures that
are exposed to antagonistic games. In Section 5 we define structural stability and derive the new minimal transversal
considerations that sustain our main results. Finally, in Section 6, we prove that one can restrict the attention to proper
game structures, or even to game forms.
2. Hypergraphs
In all what follows, A will be a given finite ground set.
Definition. A hypergraph on the ground set A, is a familyH of subsets of A.H is called proper, ifH 6= ∅ and ∅ 6∈ H.
The domain of H is ⋃{X ∈ H} ⊆ A. If it equals A, then H has full domain. The original definition [1] required of
hypergraphs to be proper and have full domain. Although such proper hypergraphs are the ones that will most interest
us, like other authors [4] we will not restrict the notion. The size ofH is κ(H) := |A| · |H| ∈ N.
Definition. Given a hypergraph H, let ν(H) := {W ⊆ A; ∃X ∈ H, X ⊆ W } denote the family of subsets of A that
are responded [14] by (members of)H— or, according to other authors, the clutter ofH. Note that ν ◦ ν = ν.
Definition. A (hypergraph) structure on A is a cartesian product G := H × K of two hypergraphs over the same
ground set A. G is called proper, if H and K are proper. G has unique domain [6], if⋃{X ∈ H} = ⋃{Y ∈ K}. The
size of the structure G is κ(G) := |A| · (|H| + |K|) ∈ N.
The structure G is called coherent [14], if for all partitions (W, Z) of A, either W 6∈ ν(H) or Z 6∈ ν(K).
This property can be decided in polynomial time – i.e., with a computational effort that can be bounded by a polynomial
in κ(G) – since, as is easy to see, it holds iff ∀(X, Y ) ∈ H×K, X ∩ Y 6= ∅.
The structure G is called complete [14], if for all partitions (W, Z) of A, either W ∈ ν(H) or Z ∈ ν(K). The
corresponding completeness decision problem is coNP-complete [14].
The structure G is called dual, if it is coherent and complete. The corresponding duality decision problem can be
solved in subexponential time [6].
Note that each of the three considered structural properties – like all that will interest us in what follows – is symmetric:
it holds forH×K iff it holds for K ×H.
Definition. Given a hypergraph H, let τ(H) := {Z ⊆ A; ∀X ∈ H, X ∩ Z 6= ∅} denote the family of all transversal
ofH – or, according to other authors, the blocker ofH.
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The holistic form of the operator τ – that does not depend on the particularities of the binary relation X ∩ Z 6= ∅ –
immediately implies that it is antitone – i.e., ifH ⊆ H′, then τ(H) ⊇ τ(H′). Moreover, it implies that τ ◦τ is extensive
– i.e., (τ ◦ τ)(H) ⊇ H; so τ 2 ⊇ ι, where τ 2 := τ ◦ τ and ι is the identity operator. These hologrammatic properties
imply that τ is a bi-potent operator – i.e., τ 3 = τ ; since extensiveness of τ 2 implies τ 3 = τ 2 ◦ τ ⊇ ι ◦ τ = τ ; and
antitonicity of τ yields τ 3 = τ ◦ τ 2 ⊆ τ ◦ ι = τ .
Moreover, the particular properties of the relation that defines τ , imply a simple Theorem of Alternatives [5]: for all
partitions (W, Z) of A, either W ∈ ν(H) or (exclusive) Z ∈ τ(H) – because W ∈ ν(H) iff ∃X ∈ H with X ∩ Z = ∅;
i.e., iff Z 6∈ τ(H). So, since evidently ν ◦ τ = τ , one has W ∈ ν(H) iff Z 6∈ (ν ◦ τ)(H); i.e., iff W ∈ (τ ◦ τ)(H). So
τ ◦ τ = ν; that is, τ is the square root of ν.
Corollary of Alternatives.Given a structure G := H×K, each of the assertions of the following three lines is equivalent
to each one of the same line:
G is coherent. For all partitions (W, Z) of A either W ∈ τ(K) or Z ∈ τ(H). τ(H) ⊇ ν(K) ν(H) ⊆ τ(K)
G is complete. For all partitions (W, Z) of A either W 6∈ τ(K) or Z 6∈ τ(H). τ(H) ⊆ ν(K) ν(H) ⊇ τ(K)
G is dual. For all partitions (W, Z) of A: W 6∈ τ(K) iff Z ∈ τ(H). τ(H) = ν(K) ν(H) = τ(K)
Definition. Given a structure G := H × K, let ν(G) := ν(H) × ν(K) denote the response structure of G, and
τ(G) := τ(K)× τ(H) denote the transversal structure of G. Note that ν(G) = τ 2(G) and τ(G) = τ 3(G).
So each of the assertions of the following three lines is equivalent to each one of the same line:
G is coherent. G ⊆ τ(G) ν(G) is coherent. ν(G) ⊆ τ(G) τ (G) is complete.
G is complete. ν(G) is complete. ν(G) ⊇ τ(G) τ (G) is coherent.
G is dual. ν(G) is dual. ν(G) = τ(G) τ (G) is dual.
Definition. Given a structure G := H × K, let µ(H) := {X ∈ H; ∀X ′ ∈ H, X ′ 6⊂ X} denote the family of minimal
members ofH; and let µ(G) := µ(H)× µ(K) denote the minimal kernel of G.
It is a kernel, because µ(G) ⊆ G; and because if G′ ⊆ G, then G′ \ µ(G′) ⊆ G \ µ(G); so (µ ◦ µ)(G) = µ(G).
Also note that (ν ◦ µ)(G) = ν(G) and (τ ◦ µ)(G) = τ(G); and that therefore G is coherent (complete, dual) iff µ(G)
is coherent (complete, dual).
Finally note that µ(G) – but not necessarily ν(G) nor τ(G) – can be determined in polynomial time; since, to determine
µ(H), it suffices to traverseH and discard the X ∈ H for which ∃X ′ ∈ H with X ′ ⊂ X .
So the considered structural properties of G are shared by its minimal kernel µ(G). Therefore some authors [4] save
the denotation dual pairs of hypergraphs for dual and minimal structures. We shall not do so, but later – Section 6,
Lemma 4 – we will show that one could as well consider only minimal and critical substructures.
Definition. Let σ(H) := {Z ⊆ A; ∀a ∈ Z , ∃X ∈ H with X ∩ Z = {a}} denote the family of subsets that are critical,
subject toH; and let σ(G) := σ(K)× σ(H).
Note that σ is a monotone operator; and ∀Z ∈ σ(H), if Y ⊆ Z , then Y ∈ σ(H). So ν(G) ∩ σ(G) ⊆ ν(µ(G) ∩ σ(G)).
G is called critical, if G ⊆ σ(G). This property is polynomially decidable.
Definition. Let λ(H) := σ(H) ∩ τ(H) denote the family of slices of H; and let λ(G) := λ(K) × λ(H) denote the
slice structure of G.
Note that (µ ◦ τ)(G) = λ(G). Using the already known operator equations and just replacing equal terms, this
implies (λ ◦ ν)(G) = λ(G) and (λ ◦ τ)(G) = µ(G), (ν ◦ λ)(G) = τ(G) and (τ ◦ λ)(G) = ν(G).
So λ is a bi-potent operator – i.e., λ3 = λ – that is the square root of µ – i.e., λ2 = µ.
So G is coherent iff µ(G) ⊆ τ(G). G is complete iff ν(G) ⊇ λ(G). G is dual iff µ(G) = λ(G). This last condition is
equivalent to each one of the following: λ(H) = µ(K); µ(H) = λ(K).
So µ(G) is coherent (complete, dual) iff λ(G) is complete (coherent, dual).
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3. Games
Let us now briefly introduce the game-theoretical background of the main mathematical results in this paper.
Following [7,8,2,10], we define the concept of a game form:
Definition. Given a finite set A of potential outcomes, a (two players, functional) game form (H, g, K ) on A, is a pair
(H, K ) of finite sets of potential decisions – one for each of the two players associated to H, K , respectively – and a
decision function g : H × K → A. So a game form is naturally represented by an H × K matrix g with entries from
A.
For instance we could have A := {a, b, c, d}, H := {x1, x2}, K := {y1, y2, y3} and a function g specified by:
g y1 y2 y3
x1 a b c
x2 c d d
Definition. Let F be the family of functions z : A → R. A game for a given form (H, g, K ), is (a situation)
specified by a pair (w, z) ∈ F × F of payoff mappings, that for any outcome a ∈ A, assigns (w(a), z(a)) to the
players (associated to) (H, K ); and thus, for a pair of decisions (x, y) ∈ H × K , pays (w(g(x, y)), z(g(x, y))) to the
corresponding players.
Definition. Given B ⊆ A and w : A → R, let∨(w, B) := {a ∈ B; ∀b ∈ B, w(a) ≥ w(b)}
(
∧
(w, B) := {a ∈ B; ∀b ∈ B, w(a) ≤ w(b)}) denote the subset of, according to w, maximal (minimal) elements of
B.
Definition. A pair of decisions (x, y) ∈ H × K is a Nash equilibrium of such a game (w, z), if
g(x, y) ∈ ∨(w, {g(x ′, y); x ′ ∈ H}) ∩∨(z, {g(x, y′); y′ ∈ K }); i.e., if ∀x ′ ∈ H , w(g(x, y)) ≥ w(g(x ′, y)), and
∀y′ ∈ K , z(g(x, y)) ≥ z(g(x, y′)). In words: given such a pair of decisions (x, y), none of the two players is
motivated to change his decision – to x ′, y′, respectively – as long as the other one does not.
For instance, for the game form specified above, consider the situation:
A a b c d
w +2 −2 0 −1
z −1 +3 +1 +2
If x = x1, then g(x, y) ∈ ∨(z, {g(x, y′); y′ ∈ K }) requires y = y2. But g(x1, y2) = b, g(x2, y2) = d and
w(b) < w(d); so (x1, y2) is not an equilibrium. On the other hand, if x = x2, then, since z(c) < z(d), y ∈ {y2, y3}
is required. But only (x2, y2) is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium. If instead we modify the situational incidence of the
potential outcome d , redefining w(d) := z(d) := 0, then a similar analysis shows that the specified game has no Nash
equilibria.
Definition. A correspondence game form is a generalized game form that, instead of a decision function g : H × K → A,
yields a decision correspondence g : H × K → P(A) – where P(A) is the family of all subsets of A. So, now the
situational pair of decisions (x, y) ∈ H × K only restricts the potential situational outcomes to g(x, y) ⊆ A. When it
allows more than one, it leaves the final choice a ∈ g(x, y) to chance. We say that the correspondence game form is
proper, if H 6= ∅ 6= K – so there exists at least one pair (x, y) ∈ H × K – and ∀(x, y) ∈ H × K , g(x, y) 6= ∅ – so
there exists at least one a ∈ g(x, y).
One can also generalize the notion of equilibria for correspondence game forms. Implicitly we will do it in what
follows: Beside game forms, generalizing a proposal of [10], we shall base our considerations on structural models of
game-theoretical frames:
Definition. A game structure for the pair of players H, K , is a structure G := H × K on A that, game theoretically,
offers the familiesH,K, of potential choices for the respective players; and that when (X, Y ) ∈ G is chosen, restricts
the possible situational outcomes to X ∩ Y ⊆ A – possibly leaving the final choice to chance.
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Given a game structure G := H×K and a game situation (w, z) ∈ F × F , a (pure but weak) equilibrium for (w, z) is
a pair (X, Y ) ∈ G such that∨(w, Y )∩∨(z, X) 6= ∅; i.e., such that there exists an outcome a ∈ X ∩Y , that according
to each of the two players, given the other player decision, is maximal.
A strong equilibrium is an equilibrium (X, Y ) ∈ G such that X ∩ Y ⊆ ∨(w, Y ) ∩∨(z, X). We understand that only
such strong equilibria sufficiently settle a game situation; because only then any possibly chosen a ∈ X ∩ Y will
always be maximal.
But – in the absence of the predetermined decision functions of (functional) game forms – if nothing should be left to
chance, we understand that game situations are to be settled by functional equilibria; i.e., equilibria (X, Y ) ∈ G with
|X ∩ Y | = 1; because only then the outcome a ∈ X ∩ Y is functionally determined by the players decisions (X, Y ).
Definition. Every (correspondence) game form (H, g, K ) on A specifies its game structure G := H × K, where
H := {(⋃){g(x, y); y ∈ K }; x ∈ H} and K := {(⋃){g(x, y); x ∈ H}; y ∈ K }.
Note that the equilibria notions for structures yield sound structural expressions of the Nash equilibria of game
forms; because if (H, g, K ) is a (functional) game form and G := H × K is its structure, then, although this
structure retains only part of the game form features, it is able to reproduce the Nash equilibria of the game form: If
(X, Y ) ∈ H×K represents (x, y) ∈ H × K , i.e., if X = {g(x, y′); y′ ∈ K } and Y = {g(x ′, y); x ′ ∈ H}, then, given
any (w, z) ∈ F × F :
If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium, then (X, Y ) is an equilibrium – but not necessarily a strong one.
If (X, Y ) is a strong equilibrium, then (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium – but the last does not necessarily hold if (X, Y ) is
weak.
For instance, the structure of the game form presented above, can be specified, exhibiting the characteristic
functions x1, x2, y1, y2, y3 of the subsets X1, X2, Y 1, Y 2, Y 3 ⊆ A that define the structureH×K:
A a b c d
x1 1 1 1 0
x2 0 0 1 1
y1 1 0 1 0
y2 0 1 0 1
y3 0 0 1 1
Reconsider the (modified) situation that could not be Nash equilibrated by the game form of our example; or
consider the following qualitative version of it:
A a b c d
w 1 0 0 0
z 0 1 1 0
Then (X2, Y 3) yields a (weak) equilibrium, because c ∈∨(w, Y 3) ∩∨(z, X2). Nonetheless, this situation allows
no strong equilibria.
On the other hand every game structure G defines its correspondence game form (H, g,K), where the
correspondence g : G → P(A) is specified in a standard way: ∀(X, Y ) ∈ H × K, g(X, Y ) := X ∩ Y . But note
that game structures yield a slightly more general game-theoretical frame than the correspondence game forms: The
structure G¯ := H¯×K¯ of the correspondence game form of a game structure G, although it has the same correspondence
game form, is not necessarily equal to the original G: If the domains of G are B := ⋃{X ∈ H} and C := ⋃{Y ∈ K},
respectively, then H¯ = {X ∩C; X ∈ H} and K¯ = {B ∩Y ; Y ∈ K}. So G¯, like all structures of game forms, has unique
domain; in this case, equal to B ∩ C . Therefore G¯ = G iff B = C .
In Section 6 we will present game-theoretical reasons to focus on game structures with special properties, like
domain uniqueness and coherence. Since some of these reasons are based on results that do not require these special
properties, we will first present the general considerations.
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4. Solvability
In this Section we shall present our first game-theoretical result: a structural generalization and strengthening of
the following theorem of [7]: A (functional) game form (H, g, K ) is solvable – i.e., every zero-sum game has a Nash
equilibrium – iff its structure is complete.
Definition. A game situation is antagonistic, if its pair of payoff functions (w, z) ∈ F × F is such that each of these
functions is an antitone variation of the other one; i.e., if ∀(a, b) ∈ A × A, w(a) < w(b) iff z(a) > z(b).
Note that the much studied constant-sum games, where ∃r ∈ R such that ∀a ∈ A, w(a) + z(a) = r , are special
antagonistic games; where any improving of one player’s payoff has to be paid by the other one.
If, moreover, r = 1 and ∀a ∈ A, w(a), z(a) ∈ {0, 1}, then we say that (w, z) specifies a competition (game). Any
such competition is characterized by the partition (W, Z) of A – defined such that (w, z) presents the characteristic
functions of (W, Z) – that specifies the subsets of winning outcomes for players H and K respectively. Player H
dominates such a competition (w, z), if W ∈ ν(H) – i.e., if W is responded by H, and thus player H can ensure that
K does not win – and player K dominates the competition, if Z ∈ ν(K).
Lemma 1. If a competition has an equilibrium, then (at least) one of the two players dominates the competition.
Proof. Let (W, Z) be the partition of A determined by (w, z), let (X, Y ) ∈ H × K be an equilibrium for (w, z), and
let a ∈ ∨(w, Y ) ∩∨(z, X). If a ∈ Z , then w(a) = 0; and therefore ∀b ∈ Y , w(b) = 0; so Y ⊆ Z . Accordingly, if
a ∈ Y , then X ⊆ W . So, since either a ∈ Z or a ∈ W , one of the two players will dominate the competition. 
This result is important for a political version of our game-theoretical model: Suppose that players H, K , are two
political parties, and that the abstract potential outcomes gathered in A, now are human-like managing agents. Our
model tells us that, if in a given situation (w, z) ∈ F × F the parties restrict the representatives they would accept
to X ∈ H and Y ∈ K respectively, the situational choice – if one is possible – would have to distinguish an agent
a ∈ X ∩Y . Then the elected agent would manage the situation, paying back w(a), respectively z(a), to the two parties
that supported his appointment.
But in particular, if (w, z) is a competition and W := {a ∈ A;w(a) = 1}, Z := {a ∈ A; z(a) = 1}, then the
refunding to the parties only depend on the elected agent’s situational position: if a ∈ W , H will win and otherwise
K will succeed. So it is natural to assume that W, Z , are the subsets of agents, that share the situational propositions
of the parties H and K , respectively. Therefore, for such elections, whenever they can, the parties will only forward
subsets of candidates X ∈ H and Y ∈ K such that X ⊆ W and Y ⊆ Z , respectively; since otherwise they would
be supporting opponents. The result stated in Lemma 1 guarantees, that the existing equilibria of competitions can
in fact be politically implemented; that is, that at least one of the two parties will be able to dominate the situational
antagonism (W, Z).
Lemma 2. A proper structure G := H×K is complete iff all its games (w, z) ∈ F × F allow equilibria.
Proof. Lemma 1 guarantees that if all games allow equilibria, the considered structure is complete. Conversely, given
a game (w, z), let S := ⋃{∨(w, Y ); Y ∈ K} and T := ⋃{∨(z, X); X ∈ H}. When G is proper and complete,
(S, T ) ∈ τ(G); and therefore – Section 2, Corollary of Alternatives – S ∩ T 6= ∅, so (w, z) allows equilibria. 
The structure of our example of the last Section 3 is incomplete. We can prove it, considering the competition
specified by the following payoff mappings:
A a b c d
w 1 0 0 1
z 0 1 1 0
This competition cannot be dominated by the players; although it differs only minimally from the last considered
qualitative situation that did allow an equilibrium.
If, to respond to z, we add y4 := z to K, the structure remains incomplete. An exhaustive analysis then proves that
if one wants to complete it – with as few as possible additional coherent hyperedges – then one can add X3 := {a, b, d}
2642 A. Polyme´ris / Discrete Applied Mathematics 156 (2008) 2636–2646
toH and Y 5 := {a, d} to K; to obtain:
A a b c d
x1 1 1 1 0
x2 0 0 1 1
x3 1 1 0 1
y1 1 0 1 0
y2 0 1 0 1
y3 0 0 1 1
y4 0 1 1 0
y5 1 0 0 1
If the structure is the one of a (functional) game form, the existence of equilibria does not guarantee the solvability
of the game or the existence of Nash equilibria. Strong equilibria are needed. Therefore we will be interested in strong
variations of Lemma 2. A first one is already implied by the following:
If (w, z) is antagonistic and (X, Y ) ∈ G is an equilibrium for (w, z), then it is a strong equilibrium; since if
a ∈∨(w, Y )∩∨(z, X) and a′ ∈ X ∩Y , then w(a′) ≤ w(a) and z(a′) ≤ z(a) imply w(a′) = w(a) and z(a′) = z(a).
So, if G := H×K is a proper and complete structure and g : G → R is a functionalization of the structure – i.e., such
that ∀(X, Y ) ∈ H × K, g(X, Y ) ∈ X ∩ Y – then the thus defined (functional) game form (H, g,K) allows Nash
equilibria for all antagonistic games. This, of course, implies the above reminded theorem of [7].
In the next Section 5 we shall drop the restriction to antagonistic games. To close the consideration of such special
games, we now present some conclusions that essentially are known since [5] and somehow anticipate our main results
of the next Section 5.
Definition. Given a proper structure G := H×K and a game (w, z) ∈ F × F ,
let Λ(w,K) :=∧(w,⋃{∨(w, Y ); Y ∈ K}) and Λ(z,H) :=∧(z,⋃{∨(z, X); X ∈ H}).
Theorem 1. Let G := H×K be a proper structure.
G is complete iff for all antagonistic (w, z), any choice (b, c) ∈ Λ(w,K)× Λ(z,H) yields w(b) ≤ w(c).
Then, for all equilibria (X, Y ) ∈ G of (w, z) and all a ∈ X ∩ Y , w(b) ≤ w(a) ≤ w(c).
G is coherent iff for all antagonistic (w, z), any choice (b, c) ∈ Λ(w,K)× Λ(z,H) yields w(b) ≥ w(c).
G is dual iff for all antagonistic (w, z), any choice (b, c) ∈ Λ(w,K)× Λ(z,H) yields w(b) = w(c).
Then all equilibria (X, Y ) ∈ G of (w, z), with any a ∈ X ∩ Y , yield the same payoffs (w(a), z(a)).
Proof. If G is incomplete, then – Section 2 – there exists a partition (W, Z) ∈ τ(G). So the pair (w, z) of characteristic
functions of (W, Z) is a competition such that ∀b ∈ Λ(w,K), w(b) = 1, and ∀c ∈ Λ(z,H), z(c) = 1; so w(c) = 0
and thus w(b) > w(c). So, to prove the first assertion, it suffices to reconsider the proof of Lemma 2: If G is complete,
and (w, z) is antagonistic, and (b, c) ∈ Λ(w,K) × Λ(z,H), then, since b ∈ ∧(w, S) and c ∈ ∧(z, T ), and since
∃a ∈ S ∩ T , we get w(b) ≤ w(a), z(c) ≤ z(a) and thus w(a) ≤ w(c). This also proves the second assertion.
If G is incoherent, then – Section 2 – there exists a partition (W, Z) ∈ ν(G). So the pair (w, z) of characteristic
functions of (W, Z) is a competition such that ∀b ∈ Λ(w,K), w(b) = 0, and ∀c ∈ Λ(z,H), z(c) = 0; so w(c) = 1
and thus w(b) < w(c). Instead, if G is coherent, and (w, z) is antagonistic, and (b, c) ∈ Λ(w,K)× Λ(z,H), then, if
we choose (X, Y ) ∈ G such that b ∈∨(w, Y ) and c ∈∨(z, X), since ∃a ∈ X ∩ Y , w(b) ≥ w(a), we get z(c) ≥ z(a)
and thus w(b) ≥ w(a) ≥ w(c). This also proves the last two assertions. 
The first part of this Theorem 1 also tells us that completeness of G is the structural property that for any antagonistic
conflict encourages a commitment of player H (K ); i.e., a decision X ∈ H (Y ∈ K), taken unilaterally and in advance,
that then leaves to player K (H ) the conditioned but final choice of the situational outcome a ∈ X (a ∈ Y ). This is
so because, if player H commits to X ∈ H, then he can expect that player K will choose c ∈ ∨(z, X). Note that
all such c do not only have the same z(c), but, since (w, z) is antagonistic, also the same w(c). So X is a best
commitment for H iff the associated w(c) is maximal. Therefore H can expect that such a commitment yields an
outcome c ∈ ∨(w,⋃{∨(z, X); X ∈ H}) = Λ(z,H). This is an outcome that pays him w(c). Iff G is complete,
according to Theorem 1, this amount is at least as much as the payoff w(b) he could expect if player K commits first.
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5. Stability
Besides the weak Lemma 2, the results of the last Section 4 only hold for antagonistic games. But these make
a very special subclass of situations that do not permit, nor demand, cooperation among the players. To be able to
consider general games, we have to focus on properties that are stronger than solvability, and therefore need stronger
hypergraph results:
Definition. Given z ∈ F , we say that z′ ∈ F is a monotone variation of z, if ∀a, b ∈ A, z(a) < z(b) implies
z′(a) < z′(b). Note that if z′ ∈ F is a monotone variation of z, then∨(z′, B) ⊆∨(z, B) and∧(z′, B) ⊆∧(z, B).
Let F¯ be the family of injective functions z′ : A → R. Note that ∀z ∈ F , ∃z′ ∈ F¯ that is a monotone variation of z: If
a 6= b ∈ A are such that z(a) = z(b), then one can always choose a sufficiently small  > 0 and, for instance, redefine
z(b) := z(a)+ .
If z ∈ F¯ and B ⊆ A is non-void, then |∨(z, B)| = 1 = |∧(z, B)|; and therefore we shall understand that in this
case
∨
(z, B) (
∧
(z, B)) denotes the unique maximal (minimal) element of B.
Definition. Let σ(z,H) := {Z ⊆ A; ∀a ∈ Z , ∃X ∈ H such that X ∩ Z = {a} and a ∈∨(z, X)} denote the family of
subsets that are z-critical, subject toH. Note that if Z ∈ σ(z,H) and Y ⊆ Z , then Y ∈ σ(z,H).
Also note that σ(H) = ⋃{σ(z,H); z ∈ F}; because ∀z ∈ F , σ(z,H) ⊆ σ(H), and for any Z ∈ σ(H), if z ∈ F
respects Z – because ∀a ∈ Z , b ∈ A \ Z , z(a) > z(b) – then Z ∈ σ(z,H). So σ(H) =⋃{σ(z,H); z ∈ F¯}.
Definition. Let H be a proper hypergraph. Given an injective z ∈ F¯ , denote by λ(z,H) the slice, according to z, of
H, i.e., the subset Z ⊆ A that is determined by the following slicer algorithm: Start with Z := ∅; and while H 6= ∅,
determine a := Λ(z,H) :=∧(z, {∨(z, X); X ∈ H}), redefine Z := Z ∪ {a} andH := {X ∈ H; a 6∈ X}.
Lemma 3. Let H be a proper hypergraph. Given z ∈ F¯ , {λ(z,H)} = σ(z,H) ∩ τ(H).
Therefore λ(H) = {λ(z,H); z ∈ F¯}.
Proof. Let us first prove that λ(z,H) is a z-critical transversal of H. If H is void, then λ(z,H) = ∅ is such a critical
transversal. Therefore we may use induction to prove the same for any properH: Then a :=∧(z, {∨(z, X); X ∈ H})
is well defined, and ∅ 6∈ H′ := {X ∈ H; a 6∈ X}. So we may assume that Z ′ := λ(z,H′) is a z′-critical transversal
of H′; i.e., Z ′ ∈ τ(H′) and ∀a′ ∈ Z ′, ∃X ′ ∈ H′ such that X ′ ∩ Z ′ = {a′}, a′ = ∨(z, X ′) and a 6∈ X ′. So, since
λ(z,H) = {a} ∪ Z ′, it only remains to prove, that for any X ∈ H with a =∨(z, X), X ∩ Z ′ = ∅. To do that, assume
a′ ∈ Z ′. Then, since ∃X ′ ∈ H′ with a′ = ∨(z, X ′), the choice of a implies z(a′) ≥ z(a). But since z is injective and
a 6∈ X ′, z(a′) > z(a); and since a =∨(z, X), a′ 6∈ X .
Now, to prove that λ(z,H) is the only z-critical transversal of H, suppose that Y, Z ∈ τ(H) are z-critical but
Y 6= Z . Clearly Y 6⊂ Z . So let a := ∧(z, Y \ Z), and choose any X ∈ H with {a} = X ∩ Y and a = ∨(z, X). Since
Z ∈ τ(H), there exists b ∈ X ∩ Z . Since b ∈ Z , b 6= a and b 6∈ Y ; and since b ∈ X , z(b) < z(a). Since Z is z-critical,
there exists X ′ ∈ H with {b} = X ′ ∩ Z and b = ∨(z, X ′). Since Y ∈ τ(H), there exists a′ ∈ X ′ ∩ Y . Since b 6∈ Y ,
z(a′) < z(b); so a′ 6= b, and a′ 6∈ Z ; but z(a′) < z(a); a contradiction. 
Now we finally are prepared to present our main issue and the corresponding result:
Definition. A structure G := H × K is stable, if – it is not only solvable, or stable in the sense of [9], but – every
game (w, z) ∈ F × F allows a functional equilibrium.
So, for a structure to be stable, we demand that all potential games can be functionally solved. Thus we are adopting a
game theoretical perspective that has already motivated some of our early inquiries [13]: We assume that any unsettled
situation could destabilize the structure. Moreover we understand that to definitely settle a given situation, a functional
equilibrium is needed.
Theorem 2. A proper structure G := H×K is stable iff it is complete.
Proof. Lemma 1 already guarantees that if G is stable, it is complete. So assume that G is complete; and let
(w, z) ∈ F × F . Let z′ ∈ F¯ be a monotone variation of z; and let Z := λ(z′,H) ∈ λ(H) – it exists, since ∅ 6∈ H.
Since Z ∈ τ(H), there exists Y ∈ K with Y ⊆ Z ; and thus – Lemma 3 – Y ∈ σ(z′,H) ⊆ σ(z,H). Now let a ∈ Y
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be such that a ∈ ∨(w, Y ) – it exists, since ∅ 6∈ K – and let X ∈ H be such that {a} = X ∩ Y and a ∈ ∨(z, X) – it
exists, since Y ∈ σ(z,H). 
This is a fairly simple proof that yields a structural generalization and functionalization of an already classical
result by Gurvich [8,10]: If the structure of a game form is dual, then all games allow Nash equilibria. But in fact the
proof of our Theorem 2 yields a stronger version of it, that also suggests a reconsideration of our game theoretical
model:
Definition. Given the proper structure G := H×K, we say thatK is stable in front of H, if ∀z ∈ F , µ(K) ∩ σ(z,H) 6= ∅.
The reason is that then, and only then, for any structurally given – i.e., invariant, not situation dependent – payoff
mapping z ∈ F of player K , this player can structurally commit to a Y ∈ µ(K) ∩ (σ (z,H) \ {∅}). This commitment
Y will be stable because it cannot be questioned by game situations – now specified by payoff mappings w ∈ F of
player H – since Y can always be complemented by a X ∈ H to specify a functional equilibrium (Y, X) of (z, w).
Concerning the solution of such a game situation w ∈ F – now predetermined by a stable commitment Y ∈ µ(K)
– the following can be deduced: If player H is now situationally allowed to decide with complete knowledge of
Y , then one can expect that he will choose a X ∈ H such that X ∩ Y singles out a unique outcome a ∈ Y with
a ∈ ∨(w, Y ) ∩ ∨(z, X); because such a X ∈ H exists, ensures a, given Y , maximal payoff for player H , and
discourages reconsideration of Y by player K . So (X, Y ) will be a functional equilibrium of (w, z).
Corollary 1. If G := H×K is proper and complete, then K is stable in front of H; and therefore G is stable.
For instance, for the coherent and complete structure we specified in Section 4, consider the following situation
(w, z):
A a b c d
w 3 1 4 0
z 3 4 1 0
The slice λ(z,H) we used in the proof of Theorem 2, first only considers z to commit player K to Y 4 ∈ K. Then
the decision X2 ∈ H and the functional equilibrium (X2, Y 4) follow. On the other hand, X1 = λ(w,K). So, although
(X2, Y 1) is a functional equilibrium, none of its determinants is a stable commitment.
Generally it is harder to identify stable commitments than functional equilibria. But it may be worthwhile in fuzzy
situations: Since a stable commitment of one side only depends on the structural aspects of the other side. So one side’s
stable commitment will be well defined, even if the other side’s payoff function is not. Therefore we may conclude that
structural incompleteness can also turn out to be a handicap in situations that do allow functional equilibria.
6. Proper game structures
Our main result guarantees that, given a game structure, all – an infinite number of – game situations allow
solutions, if all – a finite number of – competitions can be dominated by one of the players. But instead of trying
to certify that each of the 2|A| partitions of A can be responded by the structure, one may want to prove stability in
polynomial time. Such succinct certifications could interest, not only if stability is considered to be a structural virtue;
but also if it is a structural hindrance that should be uncovered.
We believe that our result may help to understand certain remarkable stabilities of real systems. For example,
today’s very common two-major-party systems seem antagonistic at first glance, but they often are quite stable. Our
game theory would explain this based on the comments that follow Lemma 1, Section 4: If the two major parties
manage to dominate all political elections, then, resting on the same solving rationale, they also will be able to settle
all profitable situations among them without falling into situational instabilities that could be capitalized by third
parties.
But, is stability always caused by a structural reason? If this would be the case, to be identifiable, the reason would
have to be succinctly exposable; that is in a time frame that can polynomially be bounded by the structure’s size. Since
the completeness decision problem is coNP-complete [14], so is the stability decision problem. Therefore, and since
we suppose that coNP 6= NP, we have to assume that our problem is not in NP. So, if we cleave to the until now
adopted game theoretical model, we have to conclude that stability does not always allow a polynomial proof. But we
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feel that this negation of our question is, game theoretically, counterintuitive. This is one of the reasons why we are
going to reconsider some of the main notions of our model.
In fact, the adopted notion of stable commitment has one weakness: If player K commits to a Y 6∈ τ(H), then
there exist potential decisions X ∈ H of player H , with X ∩ Y = ∅; that, if chosen, would not permit any of the, by
Y pre-restricted, potential situational outcomes. But such a no-outcome is in fact a potential outcome that player H
may prefer to any other outcome that he could attain; given that player K commits to Y ∈ µ(K). Nonetheless, our
game-theoretical model does not identify this no-outcome outcome as such.
So, if Y ∈ µ(K) is to be a properly stable commitment of player K – given his payoff function z ∈ F – it should
be a member of σ(z,H) ∩ τ(H). i.e., if z ∈ F¯ – Lemma 3 – Y = λ(z,H) has to be the case. So, when G is proper, G
will be properly stable, if λ(G) ⊆ µ(G). Also note that this proper completeness most probably does allow a succinct
certificate, because – as it easily follows from the results of [6] – the corresponding decision problem is polynomially
equivalent to the duality decision problem; i.e., is subexponential [6], and thus most probably not NP-hard.
But we will not dwell on the differences between completeness and proper completeness, because in the following
– for the first time, after Theorem 1 – we shall focus on coherent structures. Since G ⊆ τ(G) holds for such structures,
G∩σ(G) ⊆ λ(G)will also. For coherent structures – Section 2 – each of the two considered completeness is equivalent
to duality; and for non-void structures, also equivalent to stability.
This is one reason why in the following we shall assume that proper game structures are coherent. But the main
reason is, of course, that any proper game structure must be coherent, because only then it will be a well-defined
game structure. Otherwise there would exist pairs of potential decisions (X, Y ) ∈ H×K that game theoretically yield
undefined outcomes.
To illustrate some of the stated problems, consider the very special subclass of regular structures G := H × K
for which there exists a pair h, k ∈ N with: ∀X ∈ H, |X | = h, and ∀Y ∈ K, |Y | = k. Completeness of G requires
h + k ≤ |A| + 1; since otherwise there would exist partitions (W, Z) of A with |W | < h and |Z | < k. Let us suppose
h + k = |A| + 1; to guarantee the structure’s coherence.
Then the regular structure is complete iff H = {X ⊆ A; |X | = h|} and K = {Y ⊆ A; |Y | = k}; because if there
would exist a partition (W, Z), with |W | = h butW 6∈ H, then, since |Z | = k−1, the partition would not be responded.
Therefore, to prove whether the structure is stable, one can simply generate all members of {X ⊆ A; |X | = h|} and
{Y ⊆ A; |Y | = k}, and check that they also are in H and K, respectively. This can, of course, be done in polynomial
time.
Definition. Given a game structure G := H × K we say that it is a proper game structure, if it is coherent, non-void
and has unique domain.
It is sound to requireH 6= ∅ 6= K, since we expect that in any situation a pair (X, Y ) ∈ G will be chosen. So coherence
also implies ∅ 6∈ H ∪K.
Note finally that since we require domain uniqueness, in fact we are saving the qualification proper for game structures
of proper correspondence game forms.
Definition. Given any structure G, let the critical kernel ρ(G) of G be the maximal critical substructure of µ(G). It
is well defined since there always exists a unique such substructure; because the structure ∅ × ∅ is critical; and if
G′,G′′ ⊆ µ(G) are critical, then so is G′ ∪ G′′.
Lemma 4. Start with G′ := G, and iterate G′ := µ(G′) ∩ σ(G′) until convergence. Then, at the end, G′ = ρ(G) will
hold. So ρ(G) can be determined in polynomial time.
If G is coherent, then ρ(G) is coherent. G is complete iff ρ(G) is complete. If G is dual, then ρ(G) = µ(G).
Proof. At the end G′ = µ(G′) ∩ σ(G′) holds, so G′ ⊆ ρ(G). To prove G′ ⊇ ρ(G), we may use induction: At the
beginning, this is clear. So it remains to prove that if ρ(G) ⊆ G′, then ρ(G) ⊆ µ(G′) and ρ(G) ⊆ σ(G′). The
first of these inclusions holds, because ρ(G) ⊆ G′ ∩ µ(G); and since G′ ⊆ G – see Section 2, Definition of µ –
G′ ∩ µ(G) ⊆ µ(G′). The second inclusion follows from ρ(G) ⊆ σ(ρ(G)) and the monotony of σ .
If G is dual, then µ(G) = λ(G) implies µ(G) ⊆ σ(G), and therefore ρ(G) = µ(G). Since ρ(G) ⊆ G, if G is
coherent, so is ρ(G). Moreover, if ρ(G) is complete, so is G. So it only remains to prove that if G is complete, so is
ρ(G). Assume that λ(G) ⊆ ν(G) and define G′ := µ(G) ∩ σ(G). Since λ(G) ⊆ σ(G) and – see Section 2, Definition
of σ – ν(G) ∩ σ(G) ⊆ ν(G′), we get λ(G) ⊆ ν(G′). So, applying τ on both sides, yields τ(G′) ⊆ ν(G), and therefore
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λ(G′) ⊆ ν(G). Since λ(G′) ⊆ σ(G′) ⊆ σ(G), we get λ(G′) ⊆ ν(G) ∩ σ(G) ⊆ ν(G′). Iterating this result, yields
λ(ρ(G)) ⊆ ν(ρ(G)). 
The stability decision problem of proper structures can thus be polynomially reduced to the same problem, but
restricted to minimal and critical structures. If the original structure is coherent, then the reduced one will be a proper
game structure. So, if one functionalizes the correspondence game form of such a proper game structure, simply
choosing always one of the existing allowed outcomes, then this functional game form will be solvable iff the structure
is complete.
The structures of our first example – Sections 3 and 4 – are critical, proper game structures. One functionalization
of the completed structure – Section 4 – gives raise to the following solvable extension of the original – Section 3 –
game form of our example:
g y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
x1 a b c b a
x2 c d d c d
x3 a b d b a
This proves that if one focuses on stability of coherent structures, then one may as well restrict the attention to
(functional) game forms. This is a result that we only have seen mentioned in [11]:
Corollary 2. The stability decision problem, restricted to coherent structures – or the duality decision problem of
general structures – can polynomially be reduced to the solvability problem of (functional) game forms.
But this solvability problem, as the duality problem, has not yet been proven to be polynomial. In fact it has not
even been proven to be a member of NP. Does duality have succinct reasons to be? We do not have an answer. We only
know that the question is important; and we hope that our results will not only contribute to emphasize the relevance
of this question, but also to its eventual answer.
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